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ABSTRACT 
In tbis paper we introduce a conceptual framework that makes 
pos sible a systemat ic comparison of the many contrasting propo sals  
that theorists have put forward for imp lementing representation. The 
exposition of this framework is preceded by a short section in which 
we dis cuss various possible approaches to the study of representation 
and characterize the one we ourselves adopt as "pragmat ic," and it is 
fol lowed by a longer section in which we illu strate the ut ility of the 
framework by comparing the proposals  of Rousseau and Bentham. 
IMPLEME:n me REPRESENTATION: A FRAMEWORK AND TWO APPLICATIONS
Bruce E. Cain and W. T. Jones 
INTRODUCT ION 
In this paper we introduce a conceptual framework that makes 
pos s ible a systematic comparison of the many contrast ing propo sa ls  
that theorist s  have put f orward for imp lementing representation. The 
expo s ition of th is framework is preceded by a short section in which 
we discuss various possib le approaches to the study of representation 
and characterize the one we ourselves adopt as "pragmat ic," and it i s  
followed b y  a longer section i n  which we illustrate the ut ility of the 
framework by comparing the propo sals of Rousseau and Bentham . 
I .  
AP PROACHES TO TIIE PROBLEM OF REPRESENTATION 
In most political organizations the interests of some (the 
relatively many) are represented by others (the relatively few) . The 
ends of any political organization cannot be realized unles s  the many 
are "wel l represented," that is, represented in ways that further 
those ends . Because pol itical philosophers and political scientists 
have differed about ends, they have naturally differed about what it 
means to be well repre sented. Hobbes' conception of "authorized'' 
rights, Locke ' s  argument for accountable representatives, Burke's 
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ideal of the representat ive as trustee, Hege l's notion of indirect and 
functional representation, are classical examples of this, the 
normat ive, approach to the problem of representation. 
But political philosophers and po l itical scienti sts also 
differ about how the electorate and its representat ives interact. 
What are the variables -- structu ral , social, psychological -- that 
affect these intera ctions, and how do changes in the variables explain 
the fact that the electorate and its representatives behave 
different ly in differing c ircumstances? The attempt to answer such 
quest ions is the empirical approach to the study of represent at ion. 
The M ichigan studies of how voters perceive their e lectoral choice 
and Fenno's recent work on Congressional home styles are but two 
examples of the enormous l iterature that this approach has generated 
(Campbe l l  et al ., 1 960; Fenno , 197 8) . 
Finally, since there is usua l ly a gap between the way in which 
a g iven electorate and its representatives a ctua l ly behave and the 
ways in which that electorate itse l f, its representatives, or some 
pol itical philosophers bel ieve they need to behave if they are to be 
"wel l represented," a third approach to the study of representation, 
the "pragmatic," is possible. Aristotle's discussion of how to assure 
the preponderance of the middle class in a Greek c ity state, 
Machiavelli's analysis of the techniques by which a Renais s ance prince 
cou ld maintain himsel f in power, Madison' s discuss ions of  
constitutional eng ineering, Dahl ' s  theory of po lyarchy, are examples 
of this approach -- they are studies of how "des irable" systems of 
representation can be achieved in various circumstances. Obvious ly 
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this third approach supplement s the other two : one can hope to brid�e 
the gap between what is and what one believes ought to be only by 
coming to understand the force s  that affect the behavior of a given 
electorate and its representatives . 
In this paper we consider how proposals put forward by 
theorists who adopt this third, or pragmatic, approach relate t o  these 
theori st s '  underlying as sumptions about human behavior and about the 
ends of the state . The propo sals have been so many and varied that 
meaningful comparisons are difficult and have been se ldom attempted . 
We believe that the framework described in the next section wi ll 
facilitate systematic comparison and evaluation by bringing to view 
the underlying logic � and in s ome cases the illogic -- of the 
various propo s al s .  
II . 
A FRAMEWORK FOR STUDYING THE IMPLEMENTAT ION OF REPRESENTATION 
Our framework has three components : (1) a goa l s  matrix and 
(2) a human nature matrix, on which (3)  specific propo sals  for 
imp lementing representation can be located and so compared .  The goa l s  
matrix ( G) consists of a set of contra sting values inherent i n  the way 
that representatives might act. A profile of the theorist's 
representational goal s is simp ly a sub set of these al ternative values . 
The human nature matrix (B ) consist s  of a se t of belief s ,  again 
organized as mutually exclusive alternatives, about human nature . 
Each individua l theori st' s vi�w of human nature can be thought of ::. s  
specified by a certain subset of beliefs i n  the human nature matrix . 
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Final ly, ( 3 )  each propo sal (P)  can be thought of as a hypothetical 
imperative of the form: "If you want to achieve such-and-such a G and 
believe such-and-such B's then do P . "  Theorists seldom formulate 
their hypothetical imperative explicitly: more often than not they 
simp ly assert "Do P . "  The framework helps uncover the reasoning that 
led the theorist s to formulate the particular P that he recommends, 
and thus demonstrates why different theori st put forward different and 
often conf licting propo sals regarding representation. 
(1) THE GOALS MATRIX 
The first component of this scheme , then, is the 
classification of ways in whi ch representatives might a ct ,  or simp ly , 
the goa l s  of representative action . We do not of course believe this 
list exhausts a l l  the possible goals theorists can have for a 
representative system. We do believe , however ,  that most important 
differences in specific proposals can be accounted f or by differences 
in matrix we have formulate d .  These goa l s  are defined a s  f o l lows: 
Gl Short Versus Long Range Time Perspective 
Since policies have short and long range consequence s , 
the orists may differ about what the representative's proper time 
horizon should be . Some i ssue s ,  for example, may force a choice 
between inunediate benefits and delayed cost s ,  including externalities 
which wil l be only realized in the di&tant future, perhap s by later 
generations . The designer of a representative system must therefore 
decide what role short-range and what role long-range considerations 
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should play and whi ch institutions will encourage what the de signer 
regards as the proper lawmaking perspective. 
G2 Parochial Versus Col!Dllon Interest Perspective 
A second parameter of representative design concerns the scope 
of representation. We can think of  a con tinuum of po s sibilities 
ranging from, at one end , representatives who respond to the special 
concerns of particular regions, per sons or interest groups to , at the 
other end, representatives who a t tempt to do what is best for the good 
of the co111111unity as a whole , however defined.  Different theori sts 
will prefer, and seek to set up , representative systems that operate 
at different points on this con tinuum. 
G3 Cooperation Versus Independence 
The third dimension concerns the choice of encouraging or 
discouraging repre sentatives to link their a c tions with one another' s .  
Thi s  i s  particularly important i n  cases where there i s  lit tle or no 
overlap in voter preferences .  The po ssibili ty o f  making bargains, 
trading off is sues of different saliencies or forging compromises can 
be crucial to the function of government . A theori st's po si tion on 
this dimension reflects whe ther he wants individual representatives to 
cooperate in a systematic and regularized fashion (such as in factions 
or a strong party sy stem) or prefers that they act and think 
independently. 
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G4 Resis tance to Change Versus Readiness to Change 
Since change can either be slow and evolutionary or fast and 
abrupt, and since each type presents a special challenge, theorists 
differ about what constitutional provisions will best facilitate 
representatives' adaptation to change s in the enviFonment � for 
instance, new electoral interest s .  Accommodation t o  slow change 
involves having to cope wi th the uncertainty of whe ther change has 
really occurred : the uncertainty of existence. Representatives 
accustomed to represen ting certain interest s ,  values or political 
factions may become averse to abandoning them even when there is some 
evidence of erosion in the prevailing electoral cleavage . When fast 
changes in preferences occur, brought about by cataclysmic events 
such as the onset of a world war or a depres sion, the que s tion is 
whe ther such changes are permanent or temporary . In other words , will 
circumstances eventually return to the status q uo? Representatives 
can be very slow in their accommodation to change , or at the other 
extreme, they can change positions with every shift in public opinion . 
The constitutional engineer may have preferences about the proper rate 
of accommodation . 
GS Reliability Versus Unreliability 
Lastly , there is the dimension of reliability,  which refers to 
the consi stency of a repre senta tive's promi ses and actions: when X 
says that he will do certain things in of fice, can he be trusted to 
implement these policies upon election? Whereas the fourth dimension 
concerns the consistency of a representative's actions over time , the 
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f if th looks at the consi stency of his words and ac tions at any one 
point in t ime. Although it is easier to evaluate the statements of a 
reliable leg i s lator, thereby facilitating ex ante evalua tion by his 
const ituents, at the same time a perfect ly consistent legis lator may 
be less ab le to cope with unforeseen events, or to build coali tions by 
ski l lful bargaining . Once again, different theorists  wil l  weigh these 
considerations different ly, aiming at const itutional arrang ements that 
ref lect their est imate of where the balance l ie s .  
The goal s ma trix is  represented i n  Tab l e  1. 
[Table 1 about here]  
( 2) THE HUMAN NATURE MATRIX 
The inst itut ions theorists propose in order to implement their 
ideas about representation are not only related to their goals, but 
also to fundamental premises about human nature and behavior . These 
premises may be derived empirical ly, or they may be assumed a priori, 
but in either case, they form the rationale for the theorist ' s  
expectation that a g iven inst itution will produce a particular 
out come . 
Bl Human Nature is Basical ly Good Versu s  Human Nature is Ba s ically 
Bad 
This dist inction has been so widely discussed in po litica l  
theory that it needs little elabora tion here. The pe s s im i stic po sition 
holds that power , se l f  intere st and greed are the only enduring human 
mot ive s .  Theorists who take this  po sition -- Hobbes and Madison, fur
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instance, and in the modern period, Morgenthau � argue for a reali s t  
approach t o  inst itutions and against overly high expectations about 
human behav ior. They re commend building in stitu tions that take 
advantage of man ' s  weaknes ses (such as pit ting self-interest against 
self- interest to achieve a stable eq uilibrium) . In contrast, o ther 
theorists  hold that man is bas ical ly good and that power, self­
interest and greed are no more intrinsic or natural than the.opposite 
qualit ies. If man is weak or bad, it is  only because society has 
corrup ted him. In his designs the lawg iver can and should rely on 
a l truism and/or a concern f or the public good. 
B2 Human Nature is Mal leab le Versus Human Nature is Intractable 
Closely related to the f irst pair of al ternatives is  the 
second -- that human nature is either malleab le or intractable. The 
a ssumpt ion of intractability is most frequently associated with the 
pe s s imi stic view of human nature : not only is human nature f l awed but 
nothing can be done about it.  Attempts to change indiv iduals by 
legal, moral or educational means are disparaged. The intractab ility 
of man ' s  evi l  state is even perceiv e d  by some theor i s t s  as an 
advantage, in that, s ince individual s always act to protect their 
se l f-interests, inst i tuti ons founded upon these interests have a solid 
base. Sim ilar ly, the assumption of mal leab ility is  usual ly associated 
wi th t11e optimistic view of human na tur e .  If individua ls are not born 
with the right social instincts, then these can be inst illed by 
education or socia lization. In fact, from this point of view being 
"we l l  repre sented" may be thought to require that representatives and 
the represented alike be raised from their self- interested 
perspectiv es to a h igher publi c  consc iousness. 
B3 Individuals Can Understand The ir "Real Interests" Versus 
Ind ividuals Understand Only The ir "Apparent" Interests 
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Theorists also d iffer as to whether or not individuals are 
capable of understanding their real interests. To assume that 
ind ividuals can know their true interests is to assume clairvoyant 
rat i onality on the part of one or some of the pol i t i cal actors (e.g. 
the publ i c ,  their represent a t ives ,  or at the very leas t ,  the theorist 
h imself ) .  This is not simply a rationality of max imization, but one 
of preference format ion as well ( i.e.  i t  is assumed ind ividuals have 
the "right , "  or rational , pref erences ) .  The theorist need not believe 
that every actor in the poli t i cal system is perfectly rational in this 
sense, but only that some actor is and that he w ill st eer the rest of 
the population in the d irection of their real interests . The 
contrasting assumpt ion is that indiv iduals cannot know the i r  real 
preferences, or, to put i t  another way, that they are capable at best 
only of the rationality of max imization. For theorists of this 
persuasion the long term consequences of complex actions cannot be 
known, and they readily admit the relativ ity of interests over time . 
B4 Indiv iduals are Risk Averse Versus Ind ividuals are Risk Acceptant 
Theor ists frequently d iffer over whether indiv iduals 
inherently prefer stab ility to change, pred i ctability to 
unpredi ctabil ity,  certainty to uncertainty . These alternatives can 
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all be grouped under the rubric of d ifferential attitudes towards 
risk.  Theor ists who believe that the publi c  is inherently caut ious 
about chang e, espe c i ally those whose own natural preference is the 
stabil ity,  are suspicious of reformers . Burke , for instance, who 
admired what he thought was the Englishman's pragmatic conservatism, 
believed that this explained why England was spared the d isastrous 
experience of the French revolu tion . Others , such as Jefferson or Mao 
Tse Tung , who also believe that man is innately conservative but who 
do not share Burke's preference for stability, design measures that 
facil itate adapt ive change, emphasi zing for instance the need for 
bring ing about a constant s tr ing of small revolutions. Not all, of 
course , bel ieve that man is innately r isk averse: some l ike Hobbes 
see man as a restless s tr iving creature w i th l i t tle respect for the 
status quo . In thei r  v iew, without the strong hand of the sovereign, 
soc iety would be in a constant s tate for chao tic disequilibrium. 
B5 There are Transcendental Moral Laws Versus There are Only 
Secular Laws and Incent ives 
The implementation of representation w ill also be affected by 
the theorist's assumptions about what kinds of laws are relevant to 
pol i t ical behav ior . If  he bel ieves there are transcendental laws , 
i . e . ,  laws that have a supernatural source � or even if he 
d isbelieves in such laws but holds men in general believe in such laws 
-- he w ill take them into ac count in framing his proposals for 
representation .  F irst , the theorist is likely to hold that the scope 
and subs t ance of laws of the state are cons trained by the cond i tion 
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that legis lation must not violate transcendental principles. Second , 
he is l ikely to th ink that the behavior of representatives is 
prescribed in ways not affected by institutional incentives. 
The human nature matrix is represented in Table 2. 
[Tab l e  2 about here] 
RELATING INSTITUTIONAL PROPOSALS TO GOALS AND BELIEFS ABOUT HUMAN NATURE 
How does a theori s t ' s  position on the human nature and goals 
matr ices affect his specific propo sals for implementing 
representation? Before we turn to a detailed dis cussion of Rousseau 
and Bentham, a simp lified example may be helpful. Let us suppose, 
then, a fictive theorist who is more fully conscious of his posi tions 
on these matrices than most theorists probably are. Let us stipulate, 
firs t ,  that one of his goals i s  to increase the time pers pec tive of 
representativ es in order to provide for longer-range policy planning 
( G la ) and, second , that he ho lds the fol lowing bel iefs about human 
nature: 
Blb Indiv idua l s  think in terms of their self interest 
B2b We cannot change this orientation 
B3b Individual s do not know their real interes t s  
B4a Ind ivi duals are risk averse 
BSa No transcendental laws induce a natural concern for future 
genera tions 
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Now suppose that the es tab lishment of a s pecial policy school 
is being considered - one like the Eco l e  Normal Superieure, which 
would be devoted to teaching the tools of long-range planning. How 
would our putative theorist react? Obviously he should conclude that 
it is impractical - it would be inconsistent with Blb,  B2b and B3b,  
since they imply that if official s  are placed in situations where 
their innnediate interests are short term, no amount of indoctrination 
wil l  prevent their orientation from becoming short term as wel l.  Thus 
our theorist would predict that elected officials who must of course 
constantly weigh the short term electoral advantage of one policy 
versus the long range good of ano ther would alway s follow their short 
term electoral interest , regardles s of what they had been taught , and 
in a sense had "learned , "  in the propo sed policy s chool.  
Only if the theorist held di fferent belief s about human nature 
would the policy school propo sal appear to him to be practical.  For 
instance,  if the theorist believed that individua l s  can be taught to  
know their real interests and tho se of society ( B3a) , because human 
nature is mal leable ( B2a) then he might wel l conclude that the po licy 
s chool could succeed in training people to act in the desired way. It 
wou ld even be poss ible for him to retain his pes simistic a s sumptions 
about human nature ( Blb, B2b, B3b ) and still justify a policy school 
if he or she be lieved that indivi dua l s  are r isk acceptant ( B4b ) rather 
than risk averse ( B4a) . By orienting a policy school curriculum 
towards showing policy makers how to take risks in the expectation of 
higher future gain, representa tives could be induced to concern 
themselves about long range po li cy ef fect s if high, but risky, future 
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gain could be expected from doing so. 
But if a change from B4a to B4b wou l d  be enough to shift our 
fictive theorist from opposi tion to support of the schoo l ,  he would 
certainly point out that it is not enough merely to teach risk 
a ccepting people the advantages of risk taking . The inst itu tions into 
which the school ' s  gradua tes pa s s  must prov ide opportunities for such 
risk-taking . Clearly, therefore, he would conclude that the proposed 
school by itself  would not be adequate to achieve Gla.  
Thus a particular in stitution, say, the policy schoo l, can be 
just i f ied from more than one set of assumpt ions about human na ture. 
And if theorists differ about the value of a certain institution, this 
disagreement may be caused by a difference over goa l s  or over belief s 
about human nature. For instance, if one theorist advocates the 
po l icy school as a valuable proposal and another reject s it , th is 
discrepancy could be caused by a difference about the importance of 
short v ersus l ong term time horizons , or it could be caused by 
d iff erent beliefs about wha t mot ivates ind ividual s .  
II I .  
APPLYING THE FRAMEWORK T O  BENTHAM AND ROUSSEAU 
We believe that th is framework can be u sed to under stand the 
many way s in which theorists have tried to  implement their systems of 
representati on , and we wil l try to demonstrate its value by us ing it 
1 to ana lyze the proposals of Jer emy Benthar.1 and Jean Jacques Rou s seau. 
We -wil l f ir st " locate" their goa l s  for representation and their 
beliefs about human nature on our two matrices, thu s making easy a 
comparison of important similarit ies and differences ,  and we sha ll 
then relate these compari sons to their disageements or agreements 
about particular institutions . 
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Locating Bentham's and Rousseau 's  goa l s  of representa tion on 
the Goa l s  Ma trix , we see that they d iverged on three of these goals 
G l ,  G4, GS , and held s imilar views on one G2. The f ifth, G3 , a s  we 
shall  see shortly, is more ambiguous . 
As regards Gl -- goa l s  with respect to the representa t ive' s 
time perspective � Bentham fal l s  clo ser to the short range and 
Rousseau to the long range . Since future considerations ma ttered for 
Bentham only so far as they could be probabilis tica l ly assessed and s o  
far as  they af fected the present generation, every util ity maximizer 
would necessarily have a short t ime horizon. Re would f orego present 
pleasure to avoid greater future pain, only if the probabilities of 
alterna t ive consequences could be estimated. An ind ividua l's future 
entered into his ca lculations only in so far as  h i s  present pleasures 
and pains were affected by the considera tion of various future states . 
Similarly , future generations were to be taken into account by a 
present genera tion only in so far a s  the present genera tion ' s  
pleasures and pains were af fected b y  its thought of future 
genera tions. Legislators in the present had no power over or 
responsibil ity for future const ituents: "The power thus unlimited i s  
that o f  the legi slature f or the time being" (CC, p .  160 ) .  
Because Rousseau ' s  view o f  time was very different from 
Bentham' s he differed from Bentham on G l .  For Rous seau, time pa st and 
time future were " ingredient" (Whitehead' s term) in time present. 
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Wha t was true of a man' s  per sona l  life -- tha t  he identified in memory 
with the child he once wa s and a l so l ived in anticipation with the 
older person he was going to be -- appl ied to a society and to the 
present genera tion in its relation to past and future generati ons .  
Patriotism, for instance, wa s an emotion binding men t o  the pa st of 
their society and a l so , and equa l ly, to its future (Po land, pp . 164-
6S) . In sum, the narrowly egoistic and time-bound calcula tions tha t 
BenthBDI approved as "ra tiona l," were condemned by Rousseau as products 
of "base philo sophy, petty sel f-interest and inept institu tions "  
(Poland , p .  163) . 
Bentham and Rousseau also  disagreed over G4 , the impor tance of 
representa tives being readily adaptive to change. Because Bentham had 
little concern f or the continuity of tradition or convention, he 
believed tha t legislator s  shou ld cons tant ly sear ch for ways to improve 
existing laws: "the most def ectiv e  parts wil l continua l ly tend 
towards amel iora tion upon the plan of the most perfect" (Prom. of the 
Laws, p l6 1 ) .  
Rousseau thought that wha t Bentham viewed a s  a st eady tendency 
"towards ameliora tion" was, in societies without a common interest, 
only the result of the representatives bargaining and jockeying for 
posi tion a s  the rela tive strength of factions changed over time, and 
so far from being a ma tter of congra tula tion, was further evidence of 
the corruption of most modern socie ties . The situalion was different, 
of course, where a true common interest exis t s .  Then representatives 
would be res ponsive to changes in tha t conunon interest, but it was 
likely to change only slowly, espe cia lly if the cor.m:unity were based 
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on agricu lture, rather than on finance and manufa cturing, and if most 
citizens were sma l l-holders . 
The third goal on which Bentham and Rous seau clearly disagreed 
is the impor tance of consi stency be tween promises and a c tions (GS) . 
Bentham did not think reliability was impor tant . He viewed 
representatives a s  profes sionals, and the kind of contract tha t a 
client has with a profes siona l is not one specify ing that the 
prof es sional carry out hi s j ob in a such and such a specific way, but 
one which requires that he act in a manner that he judges best 
( Rosenblum,1 97 8, Chapter 2;CC, p .  14S) . Hence a repre senta tive wa s 
respons ib l e  only for giving the electorate good reasons how he voted . 
Unlike Bentham, Rousseau believed that reliab ility wa s 
important. Rous seau' s representative was not, like Bentham' s ,  a 
profes sional who se duty wa s to use his own best judgment; his 
representative was a citizen whose duty was to  r ef lect the wil l of his 
fellow citizens. According ly, before the start of every session of the 
legislature, each representative was to be provided with a set of 
writ ten ins tructions,  which "have been drawn up with great care, " and 
at the end of each se s sion the representative must give his 
constituent s a full report of his ac tions during tha t ses sion. 
Rousseau viewed this report as having "the utmost importance , "  for it 
prevented a representativ e's ac tions "from ever being anything but the 
rea l  expression of the wil l" of the communi ty he represented (Poland, 
pp. 1 93-94) . 
Whereas Bentham's and Rou s seau's goals are rather strongly 
bipolarized on Gl, G4, and GS , the contras ts are less sharp for G3, 
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cooperation versus independence. Bentham and Rousseau agreed that 
representatives ought to be responsible to the common interest of the 
c01IDDunity, not to particular interests but their notions of what a 
community is dif fered so markedly as to affect , as we shal l see, the 
specified propo sals they made regarding representation. Since Bentham 
def ined the common interest as "the sum of the interes ts  of the 
several members who compose i t , "  it follOloled for him that any group , 
however heterogenou s ,  had a common interest: "in so far as the good 
of the COllDllunity taken in the aggregate is the paramount object of the 
representativ e ' s  care, no obedience wil l he pay to any such particular 
will,  to the detriment of what appears to him the univer sal interest" 
( CC, p .  160).  
For Rous seau, in  contrast , the common interest was not merely 
the aggregated interests of a number of individuals but the interest 
of genuine community, and not every group, by any means ,  was a 
cODDDunity. Just as time, in his view, was not a series of dis crete 
"nows" set end to end, so a communi ty was not merely a co llection of 
encapsulated individuals. It fol lows that very large states were not , 
and could not be,  communities; s ince there was no common interest in 
such groups, they could not, in the strict sense, be represented -­
there was nothing in them to be represented . 
Final ly, Bentha111 and Rousseau agreed about one goal, namely 
the des irabil ity of making representatives independent from factions 
and parochial interests (G2). But even here they d iffered in 
emphasis. Bentham did not worry about the need f or mechanisms to 
achieve coordination ;  he held that the political market would operate 
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in the manner of the free economi c  market. Individual s who sought to 
promote their happine s s  without diminish ing that of others would f ind 
themselves " capable of acting without obstruction. " But when an 
individua l ' s  pursuit of his own happine s s  diminished the happine s s  of 
others he would "find obstruction thrown in his way. " Bentham was 
enunciating a version of the Pareto principle: improvements would be 
made if someone or some group could be made better off wi thout making 
anyone else worse off. There was no need for special measures to 
assure cooperation; it could occur on i t s  own: 
Thus , then, the principle of se lf-preference has for its 
regulator in the brea st of each, the consciousne s s  of the 
existence and power of the same principle in the breast s of all 
the re st: and thus i t  i s  that the whole mechani sm i s  a t  all times 
kept in a state of perf ect order , and at a l l  times performs to 
admiration everything it wa s made for (CC, p. 63) . 
L ike Bentham ,  Rous seau, was interest ed in cooperation and in 
the suppression of parochial interests. And cooperation would occur 
naturally in communities sma l l  enough to have an evident common 
interest. In larger societies it had to be deliberately cul t ivated 
here he differed from Bentham � but not by the kinds of ''mechanisms" 
that Bentham would have favored had he not bel ieved the free market 
would itself produce cooperation. For Rousseau cooperation would be 
ach ieved by cu l t ivat ing national pride, national patrio tism, a 
national rel igion, and a national , in contrast to a regiona l ,  
educational system -- not b y  external sanctions, but b y  knowing "how 
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to di.rect opinion, and thus to govern the passions of men" (Poland, p. 
17 5). 
These then are the similarities and differences between 
Rousseau' s and Bentham' s loci on the Goal s matrix. As with the Goal s 
matr ix, there are more dif ferences than similarities. They cl early 
disagreed as regards the intrinsic goo dness or badne ss of human nature 
(Bl}. Bentham' s po sition here was, in Morgenthau' s  sense of the term, 
realis tic. Individuals were driven by basic self-interested mo tives: 
"Nature has p laced mankind under the governance of two sovereign 
masters, pain and pleasure" (Intro to Prin, p .  1 ) . The legis lator had 
at his command "two instruments -- pun ishment and reward -- each of 
which, or both, as in his eyes occasion requires, he employs, in the 
performance of his work, " (CC, p. 35} . 
Though Bentham acknowledged that there might be individual s 
who act against their own interest s  for the sake of some social good 
- a kind of f al se consciousne s s  on their part -- these cases are 
exceptiona l .  The "self-regarding interest is predominant over all 
o ther interests put together" (CC, p .  5), and in st itutions should be 
bui lt on the stati stical tendency of the many to pursue their self­
interest and no t on the ex ceptional behavior of the f ew: "It i s  in 
what has place in the conduct on the part of the thousands, and not in 
what has place in the conduct of one in every thousand, that all 
ra tional and useful po liti cal arrangemen ts will be grounded. " Once 
this principle is recognized, he c laimed, "all pretence to this 
species of purity wil l be regarded as would an assertion of chastity 
in the mouth of a prostitute at the very moment of so licitation" (CC, 
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P • 61} . 
As regards Rousseau, al though there are pas sages in which he 
sounds every bit as "realistic" as Bentham -- for instance, "The great 
springs of human conduct come down, on clo se examina tion, to two, 
pleasure and vanity; and in the 1 s t  analysis • • •  everything 
comes down to practi cally pure vani ty" - that human nature i s  
basically good was a central thesis: S ince "every thing is good as it 
comes from the hands of the Maker" (Emile, p. 1 1 ) ,  it fo l lows that 
"man [ too] is naturally good" CF.mile, p .  106}. 
To say that man is naturally good - that he is "born free" 
( Social Contract, p. 5) -- means that at birth his career is o pen. In 
a favorable environment he wil l develop into a virtuous man and a good 
cit izen: "a young man brought up in happy simplicity is drawn by the 
f irst movement of nature to the tender kindly pas sions"; he has a 
"compa ssionate heart"; he is "the mo st generous and mo st lovable of 
m en" (Em ile, p .  102). Unfortuna tely man i s  "everywhere in chains" -
that is, in mo st European countries the children grow up in such an 
unfavorab le environment that, become men, they "pervert and disf igure 
everything. " (Fmile, p. 11). 
This brings us to B2, bel ief s about the mal leabil ity and 
intrac tib ility of human nature. Sel f-preference and utility 
maximization were the only true base s for human act ion in Bentham ' s  
scheme; i n  this sense, human nature w a s  intractable. Attempts to 
educate men to act altruist ical ly were not only doomed to failure, 
they were perni cious in the sense that they fo stered hypo crisy and 
pretension . Bentham considered various challenges to the 
21 
inevitability of sel f-preference and dismissed them. Re ligion, for 
instance, was a false consciousness (BSa) fostered by "hypo critical 
knaves "  who "with the full consciousness of its absurdity" inculcate a 
doctrine of "sympathy" and perpetuated by "the miserable dupes" who 
refused to recognize its absurdi ty (CC, p. 35). 
In contrast, in Rousseau's view human nature is ma lleable. 
Indeed, be cause men internalized the belief and value sys tems of the 
institutions in which they lived, human nature was diverse as well  as 
malleable -- diverse because the basic drives were mediated and 
articulated by the interna lized value sys t em; mal leable because, 
having been shaped by one set of institutions, they could be reshaped 
by a different set. 
Any theorist who proposed to rely exclusively on "mechani cal 
devices " (Corsica, p. 277) - among which Rousseau would almost 
certainly have included any Benthamite system of external sanctions 
would be defeated by the seeming intractability of human na ture and by 
the power of such passions as patriotism and religious fervor, which 
often resisted any rational calculus of pleasures and pains. But a 
theorist who took account of the national character of the people for 
whom he is designing a representative sys tem and who understood their 
history would find human nature ma l leab le enough. 
Again, there is a significant difference between Rousseau and 
Bentham, on the issue of whether individua ls can know their real 
interes ts (B3). Bentham denied that men have real interests whi ch are 
better for them than their perceived sel f-interests. Of course he 
recognized that ac tions have secondary consequences: the "fecundity" 
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of pain and pleasure was an important considera tion for him inasmuch 
as laws must be judged by their distant as well as proximate 
consequences; Bentham was aware of the need to discount for the bias 
of nearness. But, Bentham was certainly not trying to liberate 
individuals from their sel f-interested pers pec tive, nor did he think 
that anything could be in an individua l 's interest i f  it did not make 
him better off, or at least not worse off. 
In contrast to Bentham, Rousseau held that there were "real, " 
in distinc tion from merely "apparent, " interests. Hen's real 
interests were to live simply, in peace and amity with one's 
neighbors; to "seek sa tisfaction within oneself rather than in one's 
fortune"; to "perceive God everywhere in his works " (Creed, pp. 3, 
20). That is happiness. That being the case, Rousseau had to ask 
himself why most peopl e  pursue only apparent goods? His answer was, 
first, that the profit motive has made men "scheming, ardent, avid, 
ambi tious , servile and knavish" - in a word, unhappy -- and, second, 
that there was nothing in the contemporary educational system to 
counteract these tendencies, for whereas "justice and goodness are not 
merely abstract terms, moral entities created by the understanding, 
but real af fections of the soul (Emil e, p .  105),  the educa tional 
system unfortunately emphasizes only "book learning, " that is, what is 
verbal and abstract . 
Thus Rousseau and Bentham diverged on Bl, B2, and B3 . On B4 
and BS they agreed. As regards B4 , both seem to have believed that 
individuals are by na ture risk averse (B4). Bentham constantly 
assumed that representat ives would seek to make their posi tions 
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secure ; as he often put it,  they would try to minimize their 
dependence on pub l ic opinion. However, Bentham was keenly aware that 
in order to control public offic ial s it was e s sential that they be 
insecure and that their dependence on the public be maximized: " if 
the po ssessor of the power i s , a t  all event s,  to keep his hold of it so 
long as he lives,  or even so long as he remains legal ly unconvicted of 
a specific misdeed, the difficulty of dealing with him may be 
unsurmountable . "  Accordingly , "those who establish government must 
begin with estab li shing insecurity: insecurity, viz. as against tho se 
in whose hands the means of security against others are repo sed" (CC , 
p .  5 8) .  
As for Rous seau ,  it fol lows f rom the fact that the past 
accumulates in a people' s pre sent, that he thought that mo st people 
are risk-averse. It  was wel l ,  in his v iew, that they are: noth ing 
could do more harm than for a legis lator to ignore the se iner tias in 
order to fol low some abstract model or to take over wholesale the 
constitutional practice of some o ther society with a different history 
and a dif ferent etho s .  " I  cannot repeat i t  o f ten enough; think wel l 
before you lay hands on your laws,  and above all on tho se that have 
made you what you are" (Po land, p. 182). 
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doctrine is to impel a man, by force of cons cience, to rise up in arms 
against any law what soever, that he happens not to l ike , " (FG ,  
p. 2 87). For Bentham the only true justification o f  any law whatever 
was util ity. 
Though Rous seau sometimes used language that suggested an 
appeal to transcendental laws, the account he usual ly g ave was 
empirical and, in the broadest sense, psycho logical. "The mo st 
invio lable law of nature is the law of the stronges t .  No l aws, no 
constitution can be exempt ed from th is law" (Po land, p .  23 6). 
Certainly, it  was to the feeling heart rather than to the calcula ting 
head that he usual ly appealed as a source of authority for our 
ac tions, but that source is clearly human, not d ivine. 
IV . 
SOME INSTITUTIONAL PROPOSALS BY BENTIIAM AND ROUSSEAU 
We shall il lustrate the general relation hol ding between loci 
in the G and B matrices on the one hand,  and specific propo sals on the 
other hand by a discus sion of six institutional issues that were 
considered both by Bentham and by Rous seau. Of these six, they 
clearly disagreed on the value of two (i. e. factitious honors and 
Finally, Rous seau and Bentham agreed that the behavior of 
representatives would have to be contro l led by secular laws (BS) . Jn 
Bentham ' s  view, appeals to transcendental laws were "but so many ways 
of intimating that a man is f irmly persuaded of the truth of this or 
that moral propo sition, though he either thinks he need not, or f inds 
he can ' t, te l l  why" (FG, p. 269). The "na tural conseq uence of such 
mechanisms to control the conduct of the legislators ) ,  partially 
agreed on the value of two others (i.e. monarchy and separation of 
powers )  and agreed on the last two ( i . e. the importance of public 
op inion and the frequency of elections ) .  We wil l  consider the 
fo l lowing que stions: ( 1) Wha t was the basis for their po sitions? ( 2 )  
Jf they di sagreed , was it because of a d ifference i n  goa l s  or in 
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beliefs? ( 3 )  If they agreed, were their reasons simil ar? and (4) Were 
their reasons consi stent with their phil osop hies general ly? 
1 .  INSTITIJTIONS ABOUT WHOSE VALU E THEY DISAGREED 
( i )  Factitious Honors . Bentham strongly oppo sed the use of 
facti tious honor s  as a method of r ewarding publi c  service, because, 
unlike "natural dignities," they are conferred by a third party 
( typi cal ly, a monarch), not by tho se who directly perceive the value 
of the act being rewarded.  I t  was important to Bentham that rewards 
not be mediated by third parties: in bi s words, "affection, esteem 
and respect, which is the resul t of judgment which is unperverted by 
any delusion from source, i s  preferred to tha t respect whi ch is the 
joint offspring of sinister interest, caprice, impo sture and chance" 
(CC, p .  90). U nder a system of facti tious honors, individual s are 
likely to be accorded honor by accident of birth, or because they 
p lease the monarch, ra ther than by such utility-maximizing criteria as 
whether the action foster s  aggregate utili ty. 
Again, such awards were a source of great wa ste of public 
exp ense (CC, pp . 80-81 ) ,  and they unneces sarily aggravate inequali ty. 
Bentham knew that some measure of inequality is an inevitable by­
product of competiti on. But individual s  who earn their inequali ty by 
the merit of their actions actua l ly contribute to the general good: 
the benefit of the inducement exceeds the cost of reward . But when 
reward is conferred by a third party, there is no guarantee of benefit 
to the public � indeed, the oppo site is mor e likely to oc cur. 
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The proper me thod of bestowing honor, therefore, i s  to keep 
the public informed with the "utmost degree of cl earnes s, correct nes s  
and comp leteness pos sible," regarding the actions o f  repre sentatives 
and other of ficial s so that good actions wil l be rewarded with natural 
digni ty -- i.e., digni ty that comes directly from public esteem. In 
short, Bentham oppo sed factitious honor s because they undermined the 
ability of the representa tive to foster the common good ( G2b) and to 
act independen tly of the monarch who bestowed these honor s ( G3b ) . 
Inasmuch as Rousseau shared these goals, it may be initially 
puzzling to f ind that he favored the use of such honor s .  The 
explanation is his radi cal ly different conception of human nature 
(especially Bl, B2, B3 ) .  Since in Rousseau' s view the particular 
pattern of a man' s motives is shaped by the value system he has 
internalized, Bentham's notion of there being an incentive system in 
which "judgment is unperverted by any delusion from source" was itself 
a delusi on, the product of Bentham's oversimp lified view that men are 
always and only animated by p leasure and p ain. All incentive systems, 
Bentham to the contrary, are mediated by third p arties -- that i s, by 
the culture in whi ch the individual lives .  The only que s tion i s  what 
sort ot value system is in fact mediating that individua l's incentive 
syst em, whether it is social ly helpful or social ly harmful, and it i s  
always possible, by al tering the value system, t o  reorient a socially 
harmful incentive system in a social ly beneficial direction. 
Thus most Europeans lived in a society that valued money above 
al l else, and unfortunately "of all the incentives known to me, money 
is at once the weakest and most useless  for the purpo se of driving the 
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political mechanism toward its goal and the strongest and most 
reliab l e  for the purpo se of deflecting it from its course" (Po land , 
p .  2 27).  But this did not have to be the case . That "reserve of 
grand passions" which exist s "in all hearts "  can be redirected away 
from greed and toward honor, which i s  a social ly useful mot ive .  "I  
should l ike to have all ranks , of f ice s ,  and honorif ic awards 
d i stinguished by external signs, so that no public figure would ever 
be al lowed to go incognito, but would be fol lowed by the marks of his 
rank and dignity ; this would make people respect him at all times,  and 
to dominate over opul ence" (Poland, 229). 
( i i) Monitoring Legis lator s .  There is  another initially 
puzzling contra st between Bentham' s and Rous seau ' s  attitudes toward 
monitoring : Bentham stipulated in great detail careful day-to-day 
monitoring of the behav ior of representatives,  but he left them free 
to vote in accordance with their best judgment on all issues that came 
befor e  them .  Rousseau, in contrast , bel ieved that representatives 
should be bound to vote on all issue s  according to the detailed 
instructions they had received from the el ectorate, but he did not 
think that the day-t o-day conduct of repre sentative s  r equired any 
monitor ing. These differences,  we bel ieve,  can be exp lained by 
reference to their differing po sitions on the Goals and Belief s 
matr ices . 
As an example,  let us take Bentham' s  provisions for monitoring 
attendance.  Attendance was particularly crucial for him because 
legi slator s who did not attend produced hal f the pernicious eff ect of 
bad bills passed in their absence, but were not held responsible 
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because the cause of their absence could not be known. He therefore 
propo sed that attendance be mandatory . The legislative chamber was to 
have only one entrance where the legi slator would be paid per day by 
the doorkeeper . The moments of arrival and of departure would be 
recorded in an "Entrance and Departure Book . "  Each day' s attendance 
record would be printed in the newspaper the next day, and the month ly 
totals would al so be reported . If a representative was ill, he would 
have to present a "sickne s s  t icket, " attested to by a physician, which 
would indicate the number of days mis sed and the nature of the 
il lne s s . In the case of absence, for whatever reason, the legislator 
was encouraged to designate a substitute. The legi slator and not his 
const ituents should choose the subst itute: otherwise he could b lame 
the sub stitute' s votes on his constituent s .  Thi s  was consistent with 
Bentham's arguments that the legi sl ator was responsib l e  for his own 
judgment and that he should not be ab le to duck the pub li c' s  
retrospect ive evaluation. 
There is  nothing in Rousseau that corresponds to Bentham's 
m inute recommendations f or monitoring the day-to-day behavior of 
representativ es.  One reason, as we saw with factitious honor s,  was 
hi s very diff erent view of human nature: so far from sharing 
Bentham' s extreme suspicion of human motives, Rous seau bel ieved 
individual s could come to know and aim at the common good ( Bla) . 
Another reason is their differing goal s f or representatives -- for 
instance, their differences with respect to G5 . Bentham did not think 
that it was desirable to make representatives act rel iably -- i . e . , 
consistent ly with their promi ses ( G5b ) � whereas Rousseau did. The 
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key here i s  the difference between thinking of  the electorate as an 
aggregate and thinking of it as a community . In the Benthami te system 
it is essential that there be no statistical biases in the sample of 
l egis lators when votes on bills are taken . 
If the diverse interes t s  of the aggregate which is the 
l egislature systemati cally ref lect the div erse interes t s  of the 
aggregate which is the electorate, then the votes of the 
representatives wil l, with no more ado , ref lect those interest s ,  and 
the greatest pos sible good will thereby be a chieved. Obvious ly, 
monitoring of  voting is not required, though monitoring of  attendance 
i s .  
Since Rousseau believed that a real communi ty o f  interest is 
possible and, what is more, that both the electorate itself and its 
representatives can know what that community of interests i s ,  
representatives are "not to  express their own private opinions bu t to 
declare the will" of the electorate (Poland, p. 1 94 ) .  
Note that though Rous seau' s proposal that the citizens "bind 
the representatives to follow their instructions exactly" (Poland , 
p. 1 93)  is consistent wi th his goal that representatives should 
reflect the common good of small communities (G2b) , it is inconsistent 
wi th his belief that representatives can be socialized to work for the 
common good (B2a, B3a ) ,  for if small communities can fos t er civic­
mindedneas, an i dentity of interests between the representative and 
the represented should develop without instructi on. Perhaps this 
anomaly betrays a suppressed but realistic suspicion about the limi ts 
civ ic minded motiv es. 
2. INSTITU TIONS ABOU T  WHICH BENTHAM AND ROU SSEAU PARTLY AGREED 
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(i)  Monarchy. Whereas Bentham adamantly opposed this 
institution, Rousseau was willing to make adapta tions to local customs 
and preferences .  Bentham' s reasons for opposing monarchy in any form 
or under any conditions were consistent wi th the basic premises of his 
theory of representation. The goal of the representative was to 
maximize the aggregate utility of the whole popula tion ( G2b ) .  Thi s 
requires that al l preferences be equally weighted . But in a monarchy , 
if the preferences of the monarch weigh more heavily, the principle of  
the grea test happine s s  t o  the greatest number i s  therefore neces sarily 
violated. Far from pursuing measures that increased aggregate 
welfare, the monarch would inevitably look out f or his own interest s: 
"In pursuance of the sel f-preferenc e s  inherent in human nature, the 
end of his government wil l be the greatest possible happine s s  of his 
individual self" (CC, p. 1 2 8) . 
Further, since, as Bentham held, all individual s  base their 
decisions on a calculation of sel f-interested co sts  and benefits ( G2b, 
G3b ) ,  and since in a monarchy the ci tizens are not in a po sition to 
infli ct costs on the monarch, the monarch in turn had less of an 
incentive to act benevolently towards them: "The more ex tensively a 
man feels himself exposed to ill-treatment a t  the hands of other s ,  the 
stronger is the inducement he has to bestow upon them good treatment 
• • • but the monarch is of all men the one who stands the least 
ex t ensively exposed to il I-treatment at  the hands of others" (CC, 
p.130). 
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Rous seau, t oo ,  oppo sed monarchy, both for reasons simi lar to 
Bentham' s and for reasons of his own that ref lect a di fferent po si tion 
on the Goal s Matrix . Because the interests of the monarch almost 
inevitably conf licted with the common interest of the citi zens , the 
monarch would try to di srupt that general wil l if it existed or to 
prevent its f ormation i f  it had not yet come into being. 
Neverthele s s ,  when he was invited to draft a constitution for Poland 
he recommended modi fica ti on of the monarchy and the nobility, rather 
than aboli tion . 
That Rousseau, unlike Bentham, was wil ling to compromise with 
monarchy, follows from their differing positions on the Belief s 
matrix . His belief in mal leability (B2a ) ,  and his reverence for 
continui ty and tradi tion (G4b) led Rousseau to believe that gradual 
change is po ssib le,  while the principl e  of risk aversion (B4a ) to 
whi ch he and Bentham both adhered, led him to believe that radi cal 
change is dangerous . Changes in the institution of monarchy might not 
only substantial ly reduce its danger to the state, but actual ly turn 
it into a social ly useful instituti on. 
Since Rousseau did "not believe that a state as large as 
Poland could po ssibly get al ong without" a king , the problem for the 
Poles was to limit the monarch' s power to do harm. Election helped, 
he thought , but did not reuiove the danger of autocracy . Ano ther way 
to  weaken the power of the monarch was to "prescribe by constitutional 
law that the crown should never pass from father to son, and that 
every son of a Poli sh kinr, should forever be excluded from the throne" 
(Poland , p .  210) . Still another was to let the king continue to 
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appoint the great offi cer s o f  state but to "restri ct his choi ce t o  a 
smal l  number of nominees presented" to him by the l egi slature, thus 
making it impos sible for him to "fill these offi ces with hie 
creatures" (Poland, p .  207 ) . Rousseau a l so urged the Poles to 
"minimize, a s  far as pos sib le,  the handling of money by the king" 
(Pol and , p .  20 8) . 
But in the long run, and in accordance with Rousseau ' s  
constant emphasis o n  the importance of a n  internalized belief system 
(B2a) , he held it better to try to change the king 's  perception of his 
interests than to r e ly exclusively on constitutional sanctions to 
confine those interest s .  How, then, could the king 's  perception of 
his personal interests be changed to coincide wi th the CODDDon 
interest? Since "only a base soul is insensible of po sthumous 
reputation," the Poles should make use of the king' s  natural concern 
for history' s judgment of him (Poland, pp . 264-5 ) . A spe cial 
institution should therefore be established, to come into being 
inanediately after a king 's  death, to evaluate his r eign and to award 
him monument s and honor if he meri, ted them - or to withhold them .  I t  
was important that this judgment be made during the interregnum, lest 
the new king use his posi tion to influence,  and mitigate,  the 
assessment of his prede cessor .  
(ii ) Bicamera lism. Here agai n, whereas Bentham was adamantly 
oppo sed to the institution, Rousseau was willing to compromi se. 
Ben tham was firmly opposed to bicameralism because he held that if one 
chamber properly embodied the wil l  of the aggregate,  then a second 
legi slative body must be either oppo sed to that wil l or redundant . If 
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a second house i s  diff erent in composition from the fir st hou se,  it is 
usually a permanent ari stocratic body such as the House of Lords in 
England. Such houses act against the best interests of the who le 
popul ation and in the interest s of a privil eged few.  The argument 
that the members at the second house would have special intellectual 
aptitudes did not sway him: cleverne s s  was pernicious when it opposed 
the wil l  of the people. 
On the other hand, if the compo sition of the second house was 
like that of the first,  unne cessary delay s  would be caused whi le the 
two l egi slatures pas sed things back and f orth. If the first house was 
suffi ciently nlDDerous, Bentham thought ,  it would probably make the 
right decision since the "probabi lity of right j udgment wil l  in every 
instance be in the exact ratio of the number of the majority to the 
minority" (CC, p. 1 15). Complicating the legi s lative proces s  by 
introducing a second house would only make it easier for individuals 
intent on mischievious aims to succeed. 
Like Bentham, Rousseau believed that ideally there should be 
but one l egi slative body , but in many states an upper class already 
existed, represented by a senate whi ch had large povers because its  
members were ei ther hereditary nobles or e l se served for life. Thi s 
was the ca se in Poland, and instead of recommending abolition of the 
Polish sena te, Rous seau charact eri sti cally propo sed a number of 
changes whi ch he thought would reduce the senate' s power and yet 
enable it to make a positive contr ibution to the st ate . 
For instance,  the right to appoint sena t or s  shou l d  be 
transf erred from the king to the prov inci al assemblie s .  Thi s wonld 
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have two advantages : first,  the king ' s  power would be reduced ; 
second, Poland would move further in the direction of federali sm. In 
a na tion as large and diverse as Poland, Rousseau thought , it was 
un l ikely that a communality of interest could be achieved for the 
whole nation but only for each of the " tiny states" whi ch, federated 
together, compo se the nation. It seems , then, that he advocated for 
the whole state some thing like a balance of power s ,  with each of the 
several powers representing one mor e or less common interest .  
3 .  INSTITUTIONS THAT BOTH THEORISTS AGREED ABOUT 
(i)  Public Opinion. Since Bentham and Rousseau were both 
aware of the power of public opinion to influence the behavior of 
representatives,  both proposed insti tutions to focus and direct public 
opinion. But because of their dif f erent positions in the human nature 
matrix the institutions they recommended dif f er markedly . Bentham, 
being concerned about the need to check the honesty and competence of 
public of ficial s ,  propo sed the establi shment of what he cal led the 
Public Opinion Tribunal. The duties of this institution were several: 
it would provide evidence and make judgments on matters of public 
interest, it would have the power to render or withhold offices and it 
could make recommenda tions for improvement. He propo sed to admit all 
who wanted to be members to thi s  tribunal ,  drawing an analogy wi th 
committees in the House of Commons for which there was a rule that all  
who came to the commi ttee should have voices. At another point he 
compared the Tribuna l ' s  function with th at of a j ury which oversaw and 
judged the conauct of func tionarie s ,  bringing "the f orce of the 
popular or moral sanction to bear with greatest advantage upon the 
conduct of public functionaries in the several department s" lCC , 
p .  42) . 
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I t  i s  surprising that Bentham, who was s o  careful t o  prevent 
biases in the sample of preferences in o ther deci sionmaking bodie s ,  
such a s  his proposed Assembly or even the el ectorate, should not have 
had a similar concern about membership in his Tribunal .  He did indeed 
express some concern that aristocratic members might have interests  
that diverged from tho se of the more democratic member s ,  and warned 
that when the Tribunal delegated functions to smal ler sections,  it 
should carefully l imit or exclude the aristocratic member s .  But the 
po s sibil ity of other sampl ing biase s -- e . g . ,  interest groups -- was 
ignored . This omission is important, for unlike the legislator s ,  who 
were instructed to use the cal culus of util ity to derive the common 
good, members of the Public Opinion Tribunal were to decide on the 
basis ot their own interest , and the opinion of the group was the S l.Dll 
of these interest s .  I f ,  as seems like ly,  Bentham intended the 
Tribuna l as a kind of running Gal lup po l l, he neg lected the various 
sampling biases one would expect to f ind, g iven his assun1ptions about 
human nature ( Blb, B3b ) .  If individual s  are utility maximizers and if 
there are costs to information, attendance wou ld covary with interest 
and the decisions of the Tribunal would ref lect the intense interest s 
of particular interest groups rather than the aggregate utility of the 
whole population. 
The nearest equivalent in Rous seau' s thought to Bentham's 
Public Opinion Tribunal Yas the spe cial tribunal which, as we have 
36 
seen, he thought should convene on the death of the Polish king to 
render a verdict on his reign . S ince this tr ibunal was certainly not 
a running Gallup poll,  and since it had a one-time only function, the 
po s sibil ity that sampling biases might affect its verdict was much 
less  importance than in the case of Bentham' s Public Opinion Tribunal . 
What was es sential was that the king know ex ante that a tr ibunal 
would be convened ; it was less  important that the tribunal actually 
ref lect public opinion accurately than that the king bel ieve it would 
make "a just and rigorous judgment of his conduct" (Poland, p .  26 5) . 
But in any case , Rousseau ' s  lack of concern about the 
possibility of sampling biases occurring in the expression of public 
opinion ref lects his v iew that in a society in which a truly common 
interest exists,  samp ling errors s imp ly could not occur, whereas in a 
society which did not already have a common interest no amount of care 
in sampling would produce one. Thus whereas Bentham supported the 
Pub lic Opinion Tribunal as a mechanism for discovering the public 
good, Rousseau saw his ( rough) equivalent of it  as part of the 
social ization proce s s  di scusse d  earlier, a way of shaping the minds o f  
official s .  Thus differences in assumptions about human nature l ay 
behind their dif ferences about the function of public opinion. 
( ii) Elections . Ano ther institution about which Bentham and 
Rousseau agreed was the value of frequent election s .  The electoral 
incentive was crucial to Bentham's scheme. The es sence of creating a 
responsible legislature was to make the l egislator dependent on his 
cons tituents but independent of various intere st groups , and to 
inst ill  in the l egislator a sense of impermanence . Bentham therefore 
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recommended annual elections .  They would diminish the incentive to 
act corruptly s ince the "short-livedness of the power" would "diminish 
both to producers and thence to sellers the venal value " of off ice. 
Secondly , incompetent representative could be got rid of without long 
delay ( P PR, p .  445) . Las t ly ,  frequent elections would keep 
representatives on their toes (PPR, p .  542) . 
In addition to annual elec tions , Bentham proposed what he 
called an "al l-comprehens ive temporary nonrelocabil ity system" (CC, 
p .  17 2) . The idea was that no member of the current legis lature could 
run again unless the number of those who had served previous ly was two 
or three times the number of those current ly in the legis lature. This 
proposal would guarantee that voters had a choice between experienced 
candidates . 
To provide a place f or those who could not run again, Bentham 
proposed the es tab lishment of a "continua tion committee, " to provide 
the continuity lacking in a pure system of limited terms . Bentham 
recognized the importance of balancing the advantages of frequent 
turnover with those of stabil ity . Since consideration of comp lex 
b ills might extend over the life of several legislatures , work on them 
might be unne cessarily interrupted without the continuation committee, 
which would also help counteract the inexperience of new legislators . 
As f or Rousseau, though he al lowed two-year terms f or his 
legislature, instead of the one-year Benth3lll recommended,  he agreed 
that "short-livedness" of the legis lature was desirable.  "England , "  
Rousseau thought , "has los l her liberty [or having ne�. le c t ed [ to 
require] freq uent re-elect ions . "  ln England "a single par l iament 
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lasts s o  long that the court,  which would go bankrupt buying it 
annually,  finds it prof itab le to buy it f or seven years , and does not 
fail to do so" ( Poland, p .  188) . 
Rousseau also recognized the des irabil ity of something not 
unlike Bentham's "all-comprehens ib le temporary nonrelocab ility 
system , " in that he did not a l l ow legis l ators to succeed themse lves 
indefinitely. He also provided a functional equivalent of the 
"continuation comm ittee" in that there was to be a constant 
circulation of the elites between legis lature and magis try. 
It is curious that Bentham, who cared much less about 
continuity ( i . e . ,  G4) than Rousseau, should have made such elaborate 
provision to ensure thst there would be carryover from one l egis lative 
session to the next,  and it  is equally odd that Rousseau, who b elieved 
that smal l communities coul d  develop a notion of the common good (G3 ) ,  
should suggest short terms of office for public officials . Given his 
assumptions about human nature, it is somewhat surprising that he 
bel ieved that term of office should have a s ignifi cant effect on 
legis lators ' behavior . In a sense therefore,  the two theorists agree 
on the value of short terms of office with s ome provision for 
carryover only because both s trayed a bit  from their assumptions and 
goals . 
v .  
CONCLU S ION 
We have proposed a framework in this p aper for analyzing 
proposals tha t theorists have made f or imp lementing their ideas about 
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representation. The value of thi s approach is  threefold . Fir s t ,  it 
provides a standard means of comparing the propo sal s  that theor ists  
make. Often, comparisons are made diff icult by the fact that 
theorists themselves do not use a common language or refer to standard 
categories so that we tend to see their values ,  bel ief s  and propo sals 
as being more idiosyncratic than they actua l ly are. By trying to 
develop general categories of representation goals and belief s about 
human nature, we hope to provide a method f or discovering the common 
choices made in institutional design . 
The second value of this framework i s  that it point s out how 
specif ic propo sals are the j oint product of a theorist's goal s for 
representation and his bel ief s about human na ture .  Knowing only how 
the theoris t  would like repre sentat ives to behave is  not suf f icient 
information to understand why he proposed a particular rule or 
in stitution : two theorists  with the same goal s might take different 
positions on a proposal because their belief s about human nature 
dLffer. Sim ilarly, it is not suffi cient to know a theorist's v iews 
about human nature. Rather, both kinds of inf ormation are neces sary 
conditions . 
Fina l ly ,  this framework helps us to see that theorists  are not 
always con sistent with their premi ses .  Sometimes,  their propo sal s 
betray doubts and uncertainties about their stated belief s and value s .  
At o ther times,  the connection be tween a theoris t ' s  beliefs and 
propo sa l s  are logica l ly inconsi stent . This framework therefore gives 
us a way of criti ciz i ng the specific propo sal s of political theorists 
in a sy stema tic and logical manner .  
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FOOTNOTES 
1. We have used the abbrevia ted tit les in our reference s  for the sake 
of convenience. The titles for Bentham are as fol lows : 
CC is Const itut ional Code 
Prom. of the Laws is Essay on the Promulgation of Laws 
Intro. to Prin . is An Introduct ion to the Principles of Morals 
and Legis lat ion 
FG is A Fragment on Government 
PPR i s  Plan of Parliamentary Reform. 
All citations of Bentham's writings are from the Bowring edition 
of his works . The t i tles for Rousseau are as fol lows : 
Poland is Considerations on the Government of Poland 
Emil e  is The Emile of J . J .  Rousseau 
Soc ial Contract i s  The Social Contract 
Cor sica is  Cons t itut ional Pro ject for Cors ica 
Creed is The Creed of a Priest of Savoy 
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TABLE 1 TABLE 2 
THE GOALS MATRIX THE BELIEFS MATRIX 
a b 
a b 
Gl  Short time perspect ive Long t ime perspec t ive 
Bl Good Bad 
G2 Parochial interest s  Common interests 
B2 Malleable Not malleable 
G3 Cooperative ties Independence 
B3 Real interes ts Apparent interests 
G4 Adap t ive to change Cons is tent act ion 
B4 Risk averse Risk acceptant 
over t ime 
BS Secular laws Transcendental laws 
GS Freedom o f  decis ion Rel iab i l ity 
